Keep — and strengthen
- The duty to act responsibly ss. 31–41: risk assessment and mitigation, blocking and flagging tools, synthetic-content labelling, a human resource person.
- The duty to protect children through design ss. 20–21: age-appropriate defaults, recommendation-system safeguards, limits on contact-from-strangers — regulation of the machinery, which reaches the harms a ban cannot.
- Takedown of child sexual abuse material and non-consensual intimate images with the victim complaint process ss. 43–47, 68.
- Transparency and researcher access ss. 42, 59–64.
- The private-messaging exclusion s. 11 and the no-imprisonment rule s. 111.
Remove
- The under-16 account ban and its age-assurance machinery ss. 26–29. This is the Australia experiment, and Australia has run it for us: majority circumvention by teens, privacy costs for every adult. Strike the division entirely.
- The pornography age-verification mandate ss. 22–23 in its current form. Parliament examined near-identical site-level age verification in Bill S-210 last Parliament and heard overwhelming expert evidence about its privacy and expression costs. If any age-assurance concept survives committee, it must be rewritten to apply to dedicated pornography services only, with an explicit standard excluding general-purpose platforms — not to any service an operator "suspects" provides access to pornographic content.
- The upload-scanning regulation power ss. 12(2), 126(1)(i). Mandatory reporting and takedown of child sexual abuse material already exist in law and in this bill. A regulation-making power to compel scanning infrastructure is a standing invitation to scope creep. If Parliament wants upload-screening of known CSAM hashes by large platforms, it should legislate that — narrowly, in primary legislation, with judicial oversight — not hand cabinet a blank technological mandate.
Amend
- Turn the expression caveats into prohibitions. Sections 22(3) and 27(3) say the Act doesn't require measures that "unreasonably or disproportionately limit users' expression." Adopt the CCLA's fix: operators must be prohibited from implementing such measures, and the Commission directed to enforce that prohibition.
- Restore Parliament. Any regulation that designates services, sets age-assurance standards, or invokes s. 12(2)-type powers should require affirmative resolution of both Houses, a published Charter assessment, and a sunset with mandatory review. Fifty unreviewable decisions is not oversight cf. ss. 5–8, 27(5), 126–127.
- Tighten "harmful content." Definitions like "content that foments hatred" import contested human-rights-code standards into a regime enforced by revenue-percentage penalties. Committee should narrow the definitions and build in an over-removal check: require platforms to report lawful-content removal rates, and empower users to appeal takedowns.
- Due process at the Commission. A regulator that can compel evidence like a superior court s. 73 while "not bound by any legal or technical rules of evidence" s. 74 and can fine 3% of global revenue s. 88 needs procedural guarantees to match: clear evidentiary standards in penalty proceedings and full appeal rights.
The honest comparison table
| Question | Duty of care (keep) | Age mandates (remove) |
|---|---|---|
| What it regulates | Platform design, systems, processes | Who may access the platform |
| Who bears the burden | The companies that profit from the risk | Every user, starting with the most vulnerable |
| Does it reach algorithmic harm? | Yes — directly (risk-mitigation duties) | No — untouched for everyone 16+ |
| Evidence it works | Early but positive (UK/EU systemic-duty regimes) | Australia: 60%+ of banned teens still have access |
| Charter exposure | Manageable with tightened definitions | Severe (s. 2(b): anonymity, access, minors' rights) |
| ICCPR / CRC compliance | Aligned with General Comment No. 25 (safety by design) | Collides with General Comment No. 34, para. 43 (generic bans) |
| New data risks created | None for users | ID/biometric verification layer across the internet |
"But most Canadians support a ban."
Polling does suggest broad public sympathy for an under-16 minimum age, and honesty requires saying so. Three answers. First, rights protections exist precisely for the moments when restrictions are popular; that is the entire point of constitutionalizing them. Second, support measured before the costs are visible is soft — Australians supported their ban too, before adults met the face-scans and parents discovered their teens were on VPNs. Third, the same polls show what people actually want: children safer online. The duty of care delivers that. The ban delivers the appearance of it.
What happens next — and where you fit
- Second reading (expected fall 2026): MPs debate and vote on the principle. Constituent mail before this vote shapes caucus positions.
- Committee study: clause-by-clause review, expert witnesses, amendments. This is where ss. 22–29 can be removed or rewritten.
- Report stage and third reading, then the Senate — which, in the last Parliament, showed willingness to slow flawed internet legislation.
The system responds to volume and to specificity. A letter that says "remove sections 26 to 29, keep the duty of care" is worth a hundred that say "I'm concerned."